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Act Consequentialism, as it stands, is riddled with highly counterintuitive obligations 
that it requires of us. There are many examples of Act Consequentialism requiring us 
to commit acts that run diametrically opposed to our moral intuitions. Thus one of the 
major difficulties that Act Consequentialism face, is that since it runs so counter to our 
moral intuitions, how can it possibly be correct (assuming our intuitions can be relied 
upon)?  
 
What I seek to show in this paper is how many of these problems inherent in Act 
Consequentialism can actually be solved by an alternative theory, which is more 
restricted and universalised than “consequentialism” per se, but not overly 





There are two classes of partial universalisation problems in traditional Act 
Consequentialism which must be taken into consideration.  Thee, in simple terms (the 
first formulation), are: 
 
1. In some cases, if many people acted on rationale R, it would bring about suboptimal 
consequences S. 
 
2. In some cases, if some people believed that some people would act on rationale R, it 
would bring about suboptimal consequences S.  
 
hat I will attempt to do is show how these problems, resulting from a lack of 
universalisation, arise in Act Consequentialism. I will then try to show how various 
theories have tried to deal with this and failed, and finally show what a possible 
framework to solve these difficulties must look like. 
 
The resolution of these two problems are captured in a new theory, which I will now 
W 
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call “Panoptic Consequentialism”, a kind of restricted “consequentialism” based on 
Kantian universality. To clarify though, this framework I am presenting is not 
designed to be a magic bullet to solve all the world’s moral dilemmas, but it is just a 
rough outline of what such a theory could look like, a superiority argument. 
 
What I aim to do in this paper, is to show how Panoptic Consequentialism will allow 
us to solve the problems inherent in Act Consequentialism, by applying a partially 
restricted form of Kantian universality, in a non-rule consequentialist framework; a 
form of restricted consequentialism.  
 
Thought experiments showing how what Act Consequentialism requires of us is 
highly counter-intuitive 
 
Let us now look at how typical Act Consequentialism deals with moral dilemmas, and 
how they can lead to extremely counter-intuitive actions being obligated to be 
committed. You are a doctor (one of millions in this world) who currently has ten 
patients, all in urgent need of separate organ transplants, or they will die in the next 
few days. A healthy patient has just come into your surgery for a routine procedure, 
for which he will need to undergo general anaesthesia.  
 
Without anyone ever knowing (there will be no flow on effects, this will not set a 
precedent, no one will ever find out so there won’t be any hysteria, and it will not set 
an example for others), you could kill this patient, making it look like he just suddenly 
died from a pre-existing medical condition. Now if you kill this one patient, you will 
be able to use his organs to save the lives of the other ten. It is worse for ten to die 
than for one to die, so it seems as a committed consequentialist, that you must kill the 
one patient.  
 
Now assuming that no one will ever find out (so other patients will not be afraid to be 
your patient as a direct result of this, and no other doctors will know what you have 
done and thus copy you), it seems that as a consequentialist committed to promoting 
any form of welfare, that this is what you must do, as it is better for one to die than for 
ten to die, all else constant, with no flow-on effects. This however, seems extremely 
counter-intuitive to most people, but cannot be explained within a traditional Act 
Consequentialist framework, as by sheer consequences alone, the deaths of ten clearly 
outweigh the death of one; so it seems that to escape this dilemma, we cannot be fully 
consequentialist, and only look at consequences. 
 
Another example of where the maximisation of consequences results in counter-
intuitive practices, is that of the scenario of the sheriff who can hang an innocent 
person to save many lives. In this example, there is a racially divided community, 
which will begin lynching members of the other race unless the guilty man is found. 
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Since they all know that the rapist in question was of a certain race, they will begin 
lynching everyone of that race they see, unless the sheriff decides to bring the guilty 
man to justice. However, the sheriff does not have any suspects yet, but knows that 
unless he finds one to hang, the mob will go wild killing up to twenty people. Should 
the sheriff just frame (and hang) an innocent man to save the lives of the other twenty 
who would be killed by the lynch mob? Now let us just add another clarification to 
remove other variables from the scenario; if the innocent man is hung, no one will 
ever find out that an innocent man was hung, and the rapist will never offend again. 
 
To the Act Consequentialist it seems that in a choice between twenty dying and one 
dying, the choice is clear; we must hang the innocent man, for it is better for one 
innocent man to die, than for twenty. Thus looked at in purely consequentialist terms, 
it seems that it would maximise consequences locally to hang the one innocent man 
(since his innocence itself has no consequentialist weight), as it would save twenty 
innocent men dying1. However, this Act Consequentialist conclusion runs counter to 
most peoples moral intuitions, in that most people would feel that it was wrong to 
hang this innocent man, something that Act Consequentialism cannot explain. 
 
A more telling criticism of Act Consequentialism however is shown by a contrast 
case. As a contrast case, this example is very enlightening. It is the classic trolley 
example (combined with the doctor/patient example we outlined earlier), where a 
runaway train is headed towards five people on a railway track, but could be diverted 
by you at the flick of a switch to head down another track just to kill one person. Now 
this is a great contrast case, used to show that to the committed Act Consequentialist 
they should divert the track to kill the one to save the five (this is in line with our 
moral intuitions).  
 
Now if we go back to the doctor/patient example using this same line of Act 
Consequentialist reasoning (where it is better to save more lives than less), the doctor 
is also committed to killing his one patient to save ten. However, as we have seen, this 
is highly counter intuitive to most people; yet this contrast of intuitions is 
unexplainable within an Act Consequentialist framework. Why does it feel right to 
divert the train to kill one to save five, and yet feel so horribly wrong for the doctor to 
kill his one patient to save ten; even though in both cases we are maximising 
consequences? If we are judging rightness solely on consequences, it seems we must 
be committed to killing the one person in both cases, but how does this explain our 
intuitions of feeling it is right to kill the one person in one case, and yet wrong in the 
other? 
 
This problem plagues Act Consequentialism, as any attempts to show why (based on 
                                                 
1 Rachels, James, The elements of moral philosophy, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
1986, 106 
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consequences alone) the doctor should not kill his one patient to save the other ten, 
can just be applied back to show how we should not divert the train to kill the one and 
save the five (even though not diverting the train is so highly counter intuitive). 
 
Act Consequentialism says we should divert the train to kill the one to save the five, 
and that we should also kill the one patient to save the ten. Intuitively we agree that we 
should kill the one to save the five in the train example, yet we feel it is wrong to kill 
the one to save the ten in the patient example. Act Consequentialism cannot deal with 
this contrast case (or explain the difference in our moral intuitions when the relative 
consequences in both cases are the same).Thus Act Consequentialism seems felled by 
this contrast case.  
 
Why Brad Hooker's Ideal Code Fails 
 
Now people could seemingly argue that to escape these repugnant conclusions (and 
still be considered consequentialist in nature) that traditional Act Consequentialism 
forces us to accept through lack of universalisation of the act itself, we just end up 
with either a rule consequentialist theory (Brad Hooker) or a Generalisation Argument 
(Marcus Singer), even though the latter makes no explicit claims about 
consequentialism. However, let us see how these both fare. 
 
Let us first look at Brad Hooker's Ideal Code in greater depth and why it still fails to 
solve these counter-intuitive problems, even with its increased universalisation. 
Hooker’s Ideal Code is formulated as follows, 
 
An act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by 
the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has 
maximum expected value in terms of wellbeing (with some priority for the 
worst-off). The calculation of a code’s expected value includes all costs of 
getting the code internalized. If in terms of expected value two or more codes 
are better than the rest but equal to one another, the one closest to conventional 
morality determines what acts are wrong.2 
 
Hooker's Ideal Code was designed to revive Rule Consequentialism after the coup de 
grace dealt to it by the rule worship/collapse objection. This traditional objection ran 
as follows: “either Rule Utilitarianism is guilty of rule worship, or else it is forced to 
collapse into act utilitarianism”3. This was seen to be the case, because if you had a 
rule (never do X), but following it in this one instance would clearly not maximise 
consequences, then why follow the rule? To do so is just an instance of rule worship. 
Any attempt to avoid this objection by describing the situation more specifically 
                                                 
2 Hooker, Brad, Ideal Code, Real World, p 32 
3 McIntyre, Alison, The Perils of Holism, p2 
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(never X, except in situation A), will again lead to rule worship as another situation 
can always be found where following this new rule will not maximise consequences.  
Thus a new more specific rule will need to be created unless an infinite regress is 
followed (never X except in situation A and B and D ad infinitum), so as to remove all 
exceptions to the rule by so specifically describing the situation that what the rule tells 
you to do is identical in nature to act utilitarianism, but infinitely more complex.45 
 
Thus, this is the fatal objection to Rule Utilitarianism that Hooker's Ideal Code tries to 
deal with. He does this by creating his “disaster” clause, whereby if following a rule in 
a certain specific incident will lead to disaster, we should not follow the rule for that 
sole specific incident (but should at all other times)6. This Hooker says, effectively 
nullifies the rule worship/collapse objection, leaving it redundant. However whilst on 
the surface it may seem to lessen/weaken the number of cases where following a rule 
will lead to rule worship, or force you to collapse to Act Consequentialism, it does not 
remove them all, and thus this objection is still fatal to Hooker's Ideal Code. Hooker's 
Ideal Code merely reduces the number of instances where rule worship or forceful 
collapse occurs, it does not abolish them.  
 
Hooker also does not give a definition of what level of harm a “disaster” is.7 Thus, let 
us assume that a disaster is any amount of harm higher than D.According to Hooker's 
Ideal Code, if there is an instance where acting upon a rule would result in harm level 
D, we should not follow the rule in this instance, yet if acting upon a rule would result 
in harm level 0.99999D we are obligated to follow the rule. However what if in Person 
A's lifetime they would follow rule R 1000 times, we have 1000 instances where 
acting upon a rule would result in harm level 0.99999D in each instance, it seems that 
in each instance the rule cannot be broken. Another example is what if there are 1000 
people, all following rule R, which would result in harm level 0.99999D in each case; 
it again holds that we must follow the rule R.  
 
However, if I follow rule R 1000 times in my lifetime, or 1000 people all follow rule 
R, it will result in 0.99999Dx1000 either way, which equals 999.99D. Under Hookers 
code, this is permissible, yet 1000 cases of D (which equals 1000D) are not. However 
this is because we are looking at this instance of rule breaking too individually 
(locally) and not aggregatively (panoptically). 
 
Why should 999.99D be right and yet 1000D be wrong? If creating a critical level D 
seems arbitrary, and if following a rule that leads to disaster is wrong, surely following 
a rule that either leads to near disaster (especially aggregatively) is wrong. If it is 
                                                 
4 Pojman, Louis, “Ethical theory : classical and contemporary readings”, p181 
5 Mackie, J. L, “Ethics : inventing right and wrong”, p137 
6 Hooker, Brad, Ideal Code, Real World, p 32 
7 Arneson, Richard, Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism, p 4 
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wrong to follow a rule if doing do leads to D, isn’t it also wrong to follow a rule if 
doing so leads to 1000 instances of 0.99999D? If it is bad to bring about a disaster, 
isn’t it just as bad to bring about numerous instances of near disaster? But then where 
do you draw the line, it seems impossible to create an arbitrary level (D), above which 
rules should be broken, without being open to this same aggregative (or near disaster 
level) objection.  
 
According to Hooker's Code, because a disaster is defined in localised terms, as it 
basically says “if following this rule in this one sole instant would result in disaster 
then I should not follow the rule in this one instance (but otherwise should)”, it does 
not leave us with an ability to define each of the sole 1000 instances of 0.99999D as a 
disaster itself. As in each sole instance, it never crosses the D threshold.  
 
In deciding to create rule R, implicit in our calculation for that decision is the expected 
consequences from the instances where following the rule would lead to negative 
consequences (the 1000 instances of 0.99999D are taken into consideration as are all 
the other instances where following the rule will not maximise consequences). Thus 
since rule R is instantiated, it must necessarily be the case that these 1000 instances of 
0.99999D (and all the other cases where following the rule creates disutility or lack of 
maximal utility), create less disutility (or higher utility), than those of following rule -
R. Thus it seems that once we accept that rule R has higher expected utility than -R, 
we just have to accept that in some instances following rule R will lead to negative 
consequences, but that we still have to follow the rule (since if the overwhelming 
number of people followed rule -R instead, it would lead to worse consequence); thus, 
leaving Hookers Code, still open to the rule worship objection.  
 
The only way to deal with this objection is seemingly to abolish this critical level Rule 
Utilitarianism, and again collapse into act utilitarianism. Thus in terms of Hooker's 
disaster clause it would become “if following rule R will lead to worse consequences 
than not following it, we should not follow it”, where the definition of disaster is now 
“a disaster is any act where following a rule has worse consequences than not 
following it”. Thus, this leads us straight back to Act Consequentialism, showing that 
Hooker's Ideal Code, even combined with his disaster clause is still fatally wounded 
by the collapse/rule worship objection, and thus fails to solve the coordination 
problems inherent in Act Consequentialism. 
 
Now we have seen that Hooker’s rule consequentialism (Ideal Code) tries to deal with 
the rule worship objection by installation of his “disaster clause”. However his disaster 
clause (due to negative effects having to be of a certain level before being considered 
a disaster) still leaves his Ideal Code very open to the rule worship objection and does 
nothing to solve it (sure it lessons the cases where rule worship exists, but it doesn’t 
abolish it). This is especially true in an aggregative/panoptic sense where a huge 
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number of bad effects of just less (by a minute degree) than disaster level are allowed 
to occur, because each single (local) act does not cross the disaster threshold on its 
own.  
 
Thus in order to further deal with this incoherence objection, Hooker has to seemingly 
collapse his Ideal Code into Act Consequentialism, as looking at “disasters” singularly 
(or using a critical level) is too arbitrary and thus incoherent. Thus, either Hooker's 
Ideal Code is still fatally wounded by the rule worship objection (his disaster clause 
does not achieve what it sets out to achieve), or in order to survive this it has to 
collapse into Act Consequentialism(and will thus have to face all the problems with 
Act Consequentialism that we have outlined above). 
 
Why Marcus Singer's Generalisation Argument fails 
 
Given these fatal flaws in Rule Utilitarianism, some people say we could just move 
towards a theory like Marcus Singer’s Generalisation Argument, which also has 
greater universalisation than Act Consequentialism. Singer starts from what he claims 
to be two logically necessary premises for any plausible ethical theory. For any 
plausible ethical theory to be used as a principle for guiding action, A and B must 
necessarily hold true; otherwise as a moral theory it, cannot offer any action-guiding 
principles (oughts)8. 
 
A.       If the consequences of A doing X would be undesirable, then A ought not to do 
X9 
 
This is then generalised to form: 
 
B.       If the consequences of everyone doing X would be undesirable, then not 
everyone ought to do X10 
 
Singer claims that the denial of these premises involves “self-contradiction”, and thus 
this is the starting point for his argument.11  Singer then, in greater detail, outlines his 
full argument as follows: 
 
1.      If the consequences of A's doing X would be undesirable then A does not have 
the right to do X12 
 
This is then  used to form the generalised version of the principle of consequences, 
                                                 
8 Singer, Marcus, Generalization in Ethics, p64 
9 ibid, p63 
10 ibid, p65 
11 ibid p48 
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2.     If the consequences of everyone's doing X would be undesirable, then not 
everyone has the right to do x.13 
 
This then becomes the generalised principle 
 
3.      If not everyone has the right to do X, then no one has the right to do X.14 
 
From here, Singer says, the generalised argument clearly follows15, 
 
4.      If the consequences of everyone's doing X would be undesirable, then no one 
has the right to do X  
 
To the reader, on the surface it seems that if we accept Singer’s claim that A and B are 
both logically necessary (which I do), that we must then accept Singer’s other 
premises 1-4 (which I do not). However there is one major flaw here; in A and B, 
Singer uses the word “ought”, in 1-4 Singer uses “right”, this difference makes all the 
difference in whether or not accepting A and B, entails accepting 1-4 (or even 1-2). 
  
“Not everyone ought to do X” is not the same as “not everyone has a right to do x”. 
For example, not everyone ought to have children (because we cannot be forced to 
bear children against our will), but everyone has a right to have children. If we accept 
B (as Singer does) that, “If the consequences of everyone doing X would be 
undesirable, then not everyone ought to do X”, it does not lead us to “If the 
consequences of everyone doing X would be undesirable, then not everyone has the 
right to do X” as this has an altogether completely different meaning.  
 
Thus, we have seen that from Singer’s original argument (A and B), it does not lead us 
to 1-4, which is an entirely different matter. However let us leave this criticism aside 
for the moment and see what happens if we assume (as Singer presupposes) that 
oughts are indeed identical to rights, and thus that Singer’s actual argument begins 
from 1-4. 
 
Premise 3 relies on its first half (if not everyone has the right to do X), entailing its 
second half (then no one has the right to do X). However this will not always hold 
true, if "everyone" (as Singer is using it in this sense) is used to describe the complete 
set (all the elements within it), and not a subset. If not everyone has the right to vote, 
then no one has the right to vote, obviously does not hold true, as the severely 
mentally handicapped do not have a right to vote (they are part of a relevantly distinct 
subset, those elements being agents who are so severely mentally handicapped), but 
this does not mean that no one (elements who are not part of this subset) has the right 
                                                 
13 ibid, p66 
14 ibid, p66 









Even if we accept for the moment that “has a right to do” and “ought to do” can be 
used interchangeably (and that premise 3 is true), we still encounter some difficulties 
when looking at Singer’s argument in stages 1-4. His argument falters when looking at 
premises 2-4 again due to another equivocal definitional issue; this time again 
concerning his use of the word “everyone”. In (2), “everyone” is used as a collective 
noun, as the totality of a set, whilst in (3) it is used individually (distributively), thus 
premise 3 does not actually follow on from premise 2 as strongly as Singer assumes. 
In (2) “everyone” is used collectively, this creates a statement of the form “if the 
consequences of everyone doing X together (at the same time) would be undesirable, 
then it is not right for everyone to do X together (or at the same time)”. 
 
However given this, it seems that premise 3 is incoherent as in (3), “everyone” is 
clearly used in  a distributive sense and not in a collective sense, as it is used 
descriptively about individual members of a set(especially so with “no one”). Thus (3) 
means “if among everyone there is someone who ought not to do X, then no one ought 
to do X”. This seems to be an act of definitial confusion, using “everyone” in a 
collective sense in one premise, and then using “everyone” in a distributive sense in 
another premise. Thus, it seems that premise two, when combined with premise 3, 
does not entail the conclusion (4), again showing a weakness in the soundness of 
Singer’s Generalisation Argument.  
 
From premise 2, “If the consequences of everyone's doing X would be undesirable, 
then not everyone has the right to do X.”, premise 3,  “If not everyone has the right to 
do X, then no one has the right to do X” thus does not necessarily follow, as Singer 
thus confuses everyone/anyone and not everyone/no one, which can easily be shown 
(with simple set theory) to  be totally different and thus not equal to each other(like 
how Singer uses them). Premise three would could be seen to be more valid (though 
be entirely tautologous) if it said “If not everyone has the right to do x (collectively at 
the same time), then not everyone has the right to do X (collectively at the same 
time)”. As everyone in this sense is collective (if everyone together at the same time), 
and not individual (no one at all). However, since premise 2 uses everyone 
collectively, and premise 3 is individual (no one), his argument is unsound. 
 
Thus if (3) does not follow from (2), then (4) is not necessarily entailed and thus the 
argument is unsound. As we have seen premise 2 (collective) is actually asking, “if the 
consequences of everyone doing X together (at the same time) would be undesirable, 
then it is not right for everyone to do X together (or at the same time)”, and premise 3 
(individual) is asking, “if among everyone there is someone who ought not to do X, 
then no one ought to do X”. We can clearly see here the (2) does not necessarily entail 
(3), and thus (4) is not necessarily entailed either, so we are not committed to Singer's 
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to do X” exists, does not mean that “no one ought to do X”. As we have already 
shown, that “someone” might be excluded as they are part of another subset of the 
relevant class (like a disqualified voter, who is clinically insane) who’s existence does 
not disqualify everyone else from voting (people who are part of the class A, but not 
part of the subset B). 
 
Thus, Singer's Generalisation Argument is full of flaws and must thus be discredited 
as a means of solving the coordination problems inherent in Act Consequentialism. 
We must however accept Singer’s first two premises (where B is necessarily entailed 
by A by definition), since (bad consequence = undesirable), 
 
A. If the consequences of A doing X would be undesirable, then A ought not to do 
X 
 
B. If the consequences of everyone doing X would be undesirable, then not 
everyone ought to do X 
 
but not his argument (1-4) which confuses anyone/everyone and not everyone/no one 
as well as the ought/right distinction.  
 
Thus we have seen how counter intuitive obligations arise in Act Consequentialism 
due to lack of universalisation, and how the main theories attempting to deal with this 
universalisation problem (Rule Utilitarianism and Generalisation Arguments) fail. 
Thus in order to move forward we must look at other methods of escaping these 
dilemma by perhaps looking at a “consequentialism” with a partial as opposed to full 
universalisation (what if some people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly 
similar circumstances, what if some people believe that others would act in a similar 




Now after seeing how counter intuitive obligations arise in Act Consequentialism and 
how other theories have tried to solve these problems and failed, it seems a new theory 
must be created to deal with these partial universalisation problems, which I will call 
Panoptic Consequentialism, due to its panoptic viewpoint.  
 
Panoptic Consequentialism seeks a middle ground between being overly demanding 
and repugnant, versus not being demanding enough and between over-universalising, 
versus under-universalising. It is by appealing to this middle ground that it escapes 
many of the objections faced by other theories. 
 
The Eligibility Test under Panoptic Consequentialism that any act must pass is 
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formal second formulation of the Panoptic Principle (the first of which we outlined in 
the introduction): 
 
1. “What if some other people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly similar 
circumstances?” 
 
2. “What if some people believed that some others would act in a similar way to me?” 
An act can only pass the Eligibility test if the answer to both question one and two 
would be “it would be expected not to bring about worse consequences than if I hadn’t 
acted at all”.  If two or more acts pass the Eligibility Test, the one with the highest 
expected utility is the one we ought to do, if only one act passes the Eligibility Test, 
then this is one we ought to do. 
 
You can clearly see the Kantian flavour implied by this new restricted 
consequentialism.  However, its major difference is that when a Kantian is deciding 
whether to do an act, they try to will it as a universal law16 (what if everyone did that). 
Whether or not the act is permissible is not based upon the welfarist consequences of 
everyone doing that act (if the consequences would be good or bad for welfare), but 
rather if everyone doing that act would result in a logical contradiction (e.g. in order to 
tell a lie, someone needs to believe you) then it is not permissible.  
 
For a Rule Utilitarian they decide on right and wrong based on rules, not on acts, they 
do not judge actions on case-by-case basis, but rather by a blanket rule. For a 
consequentialist, only consequences matter, nothing else. For the purposes of this 
essay, I will stay away from a Kantian approach of contradictions in the will, and look 
towards a more welfarist approach. Thus, in this paper I will not be looking at any 
objections to Kantianism, but will rather look at objections to other welfare dependent 
theories. 
 
Thus, this new form of restricted consequentialism, which I will call “Panoptic 
Consequentialism” incorporates the universalism of Kantianism (willing it as a 
universal law) into its viewpoint in a partial form, from a welfarist perspective, whilst 
looking at acts on a case-by-case basis. It is not defeated by the common rule worship 
objection either, as it makes no claim about trying to maximise the consequences of 
the act itself (as neither does Kantianism), but rather maximisation of consequences 
for any act that passes the Eligibility Test, once partially universalised.  
 
Panoptic Consequentialism does not strive to maximise consequences locally (those of 
doing the act itself), it only tries to maximise panoptic implications from those acts 
which pass the Eligibility Test in the first place (hypothetical consequences), those 
that would be expected to arise if the act were partially universalised, and thus does 
                                                 
16 Rachels, James, “The elements of moral philosophy”, p119 
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not claim to be fully consequentialist (but rather Kantian in heritage). You cannot 
criticise a Kantian for being guilty of rule worship, for they never claim to be trying to 
maximise local consequences, and thus you cannot criticise a Panoptic 
Consequentialist on these grounds either. 
 
Another way to see the difference between Panoptic Consequentialism and Rule 
Utilitarianism is that rule consequentialism asks, “Which rule if internalized by the 
overwhelming majority of people, would be most expected to maximise 
consequences”. We have already seen how Panoptic Consequentialism just looks at 
“some” people and not an “overwhelming majority”, but where it differs more, is that 
it does not look at “Which act if done by some people would maximise expected 
consequences”, but rather, “Which act that passes the Eligibility Test can be most 
expected to maximise consequences”. Only acts that pass this Eligibility Test in the 
first place are to be considered when deciding which of these acts will be most 
expected to maximise consequences. 
 
Thus as we have seen this panoptic principle is not a full Kantian univeralisation 
(willing something as universal law implies everyone will be acting in a similar 
manner to me, and that everyone will be believing that everyone will be acting in a 
similar way to me). However, neither is it a full Rule Utilitarian univeralisation 
(asking which rule would maximise consequences if internalized by an overwhelming 
majority, or a Generalisation Argument for that matter. It does not ask “which 
rule......would maximise consequences.....”, but rather “which act......would maximise 
consequences.....given that it passes the Eligibility Test...”, and thus is act based, not 
rule based, adaptable to each individual situation on case by case basis, and not 
categorical or blanket in nature. Panoptic Consequentialism asks what’ if “some” 
people did as I did (in relevantly similar circumstances), or what if “some” people 
believed that “some” others would act as I did, and thus does not have to rely on any 




Typical epistemological objection to this theory will seem to be that, whereby, 
depending on the definition of “some”, how many people that act as I do or believe 
that others will, will change the consequences (it may be the case that 5 people acting 
like me is bad, but that 6 is good, but yet 8 is bad etc), so the consequences of this 
partial universalisation will depend on what level “some” take.  However, if it is ever 
the case that “some” people acting in a similar way to me will be expected to result in 
worse consequences than had I not acted, it would fail this test. If there were even a 
sole instance where a number of people acting in similar way to me (in relevantly 
similar circumstances) would be expected to result in worse consequences (than had I 
not acted), the act would not pass the Eligibility test, and thus not be permissible. 
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“Some” in a way represents all the sharpenings of the word, and if any of the 
sharpenings fail the test, then the act will fail the Eligibility Test. 
 
The same goes for the “some” in the second question of “what if some people believed 
that some others would act in a similar way to me”. Whereby if it is ever the case that 
it would result in worse consequences than had I not acted, regardless of who the 
“some” are, it will fail the Eligibility Test 
Thus, again we have we seen that sure, sometimes it may maximise consequences if  
“...some other people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly similar 
circumstances”, but if there is even one case where doing so will result in worse 
consequences than if I hadn’t done that, then the act fails the Eligibility Test. It does 
not matter if in 99% of cases it passes the test, the existence of the 1% alone, makes 
this fail the test. 
 
Thus, we can now reformulate the Panoptic Principle in a third form, its strongest and 
most formal formulation: 
 
1.  “For some number of other people N, if N people acted in a similar way to me in 
relevantly similar circumstances, would it be expected to result in worse consequences 
than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
2. “For a person P, if P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, 
would it be expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
An act will only pass the Eligibility Test if the answer to both questions is “No”, 
regardless of the numerical value of N, or the identity of P or Q.  If two or more acts 
pass the Eligibility Test the one with the highest expected utility is the one we ought to 
do, if only once act passes the Eligibility test, then this is the act we ought to do. 
 
Thus, we can see that if for any value of N, or for any person P or Q, the answer to any 
of the questions is “Yes”, then this action is impermissible as it fails the Eligibility 
test. 
 
In both Kantianism and Rule Utilitarianism there is no distinction between question 1 
and 2; they are both captured by the categorical imperative or the ideal code (the 
“some” are both not just identical sets, but the one and the same set of “all”), and thus 
there is no need or furthermore ability/way to separate them out.  
 
However in Panoptic Consequentialism (which is not phrased in this manner) the 
people who will act in a similar way to me could be different people to the people who 
believe that some others may act in a similar way to me, and could even be different 
people to the people that some others believe will act in a similar way to me; 3 distinct 
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classes of people. This separation into three distinct classes again helps with the 
relevantly similar distinction, as not everyone in each of those classes will be in 
relevantly similar circumstances to someone else in another class. 
 
Relevantly Similar Distinctions 
 
A key concept here is in “relevantly similar circumstances”. If I was deciding whether 
to buy a bottle of coke and asked myself, “If for some number of other people N, if N 
people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly similar circumstances, would it be 
expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?”, it would be 
false for me to reason that,  “If a poor person bought a bottle of coke (instead of 
feeding his child) that would be expected to result in worse consequences than had I 
not acted” (if the act were to be partially  universalised), and thus it would be false for 
me to reason that I ought not to buy a bottle of coke. This is false, as the poor person’s 
circumstances are not relevantly similar to mine! This is just one example of defining 
“relevantly similar”; however, there are others that we will look at later, to explain 
what is meant by “relevantly similar”. 
 
Now just for clarity here, the “relevantly similar” clause only applies to the first 
question (by definition), and not the second. The first question asks, “For some 
number of other people N, if N people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly 
similar circumstances, would it be expected to result in worse consequences than if I 
hadn't acted at all?”  However, the second question asks, “For a person P, if P believed 
that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, would it be expected to result in 
worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
A good way to see this distinction is in another example. Imagine there is an employer 
who is racially discriminatory and will only hire French workers. This is not a public 
policy of his, and no one knows it. Now just by chance, of all the people that have 
come in for job interviews, the best applicants have by sheer luck, all been French. 
Though them being the best applicants (based on test scores) had no influence on why 
he chose to employ them (which was because they were French), it is nevertheless the 
case that he hires the best applicants for the job. 
 
What circumstances are relevantly similar in this sort of scenario? Suppose for 
arguments sake that “being racially discriminatory, when the circumstances are such 
that those who are French are actually the best applicants in this instance” is relevantly 
similar (even though I believe it is not).  Let us look at this from the perspective of the 
second question: 
 
For a person P, if P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, would 
it be expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
“ 
Caribbean Journal of Philosophy Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012 (Published July 2015) 
 
 
Now if “for some number of other people N, if N people acted in a similar way to me 
in relevantly similar circumstances” (by being racially discriminatory, when the 
circumstances are such that those who are French are actually the best applicants in 
this instance), it seems that it will result in good consequences, and thus this passes the 
first test.  However if we look at the second test “For a person P, if P believed that 
someone Q would act in a similar way to me, would it be expected to result in worse 
consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?”, we are not asking, “For a person P…” 
(where P is a racially discriminatory Francophile),  “if P believed that someone Q 
would act in a similar way to me, would it be expected to result in worse 
consequences than if I hadn't acted at all” (as if they did believe this, it would not 
result in any bad consequences)?.  
 
But rather “For a person P...” (they do not have to be relevantly similar to me), “...if P 
believed that someone Q...” (who do not have to be relevantly similar to me), would 
act in a similar way to me (only hiring French people), would doing so be expected to 
result in worse consequences than me not discriminating, to which the answer is 
clearly yes. This is because a person who was thinking of going for a job as an 
emergency surgeon, but believed that his potential employer was a racist Francophile, 
would not even bother applying for the job if he was not French even if he would have 
been the person best suited to it.  
 
Even if relevantly similar is not to be understood as “being racially discriminatory, 
when the circumstances are such that those who are French are actually the best 
applicants in this instance” (which I believe it is not, as race is not a morally relevant 
distinction for employment in this case, and thus is racist), Panoptic Consequentialism 
still solves this problem. This is because “For some number of other people N, if N 
people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly similar circumstances”, (where the 
relevantly similar circumstances are just that of being an employer in need of 
emergency surgeons, and not of being a racially discriminatory Francophile) it would 
be expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all, because it 
could be the case that the best applicant (who is not French) would not get the job.  
Thus even if “being racially discriminatory, when the circumstances are such that 
those who are French are actually the best applicants in this instance”, is not a 
relevantly similar circumstance(which I believe it is not), being racially discriminatory 
fails the Eligibility Test and is thus impermissible. 
 
To Kantianism and Rule Utilitarianism or the Generalisation Argument, the set of 
people acting in a similar manner to me is necessarily identical to the set of people 
believing that others will act in a similar manner to me(due to full universalisation), 
however in Panoptic Consequentialism the sets do not necessarily have to be identical. 
Thus panoptic consequential does not fully “universalise” as Rule Utilitarianism, 
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Kantianism, or Generalisation Arguments do, and thus are not prone to the problems 
these theories have. Thus, by partially universalising, it avoids the problems in Act 
Consequentialism (which does not universalise enough) as well as the problems within 
Rule Utilitarianism/Kantianism/Generalisation Arguments (which over universalise). 
 
Thus Panoptic Consequentialism is neither fully consequentialist (if no one will act in 
a similar way to me and no one will believe that others will act in a similar way to me, 
these are not consequences, but rather hypothetical universals), nor fully Kantian (we 
are concerned about welfare and not about trying to avoid committing contradictions 
in the will) nor Rule Utilitarian (there are no blanket rules saying it is always wrong to 
do X, nor a Generalisation Argument (what if everyone did that). It is by being 
adaptable situation by situation, act based, not rule based, and without a fixed 
compliance/acceptance level, that we are able to solve many moral dilemmas (or 
counter-intuitive obligations) that Act Consequentialism entails of us, and that plague 
these rule based theories. 
 
Now remember we are not saying (this is not the principle): “Taking into 
consideration that if for some number of other people N, N people acted in a similar 
way to me in relevantly similar circumstances,  and that if for a person P, P believed 
that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, which act would be expected to 
maximise consequences?” as, regardless if the act will maximise consequences or not, 
it is only permissible if it passes both tests (and it of all the acts that pass the 
Eligibility Test it is the one with the highest expected utility).  
 
It will never be the case that “A” and “not A” (where A is doing act X) will both fail 
the permissibility test; that is just logically impossible (and thus it is impossible for us 
to be left morally stranded, where nothing we can do will pass the Eligibility Test). 
This is because for any act A, not A-ing is necessarily equivalent to not acting. 
Now just because it is not logically possible for “A” and “not A” to both fail the 
Eligibility Test, does not mean it is logically impossible for “A” and “not A” to both 
pass the Eligibility test. This can happen, however if it does, the act we ought to do is 
the one which has the highest expected utility. 
 
It may be the case that “not A” passes the Eligibility Test and that “A” fails it, but 
when partially universalised “A” will result in higher expected utility than “not A” 
(due to the utility it increases by satisfying one test exceeding the utility it decreases 
by failing the other test). However, because “A” does not pass the permissibility test, 
it is impermissible and we must do “not A” instead, as the Eligibility Test can be 
considered as a test which cannot be trumped by better consequences. Even if 
something will result in higher expected utility when partially universalised, we can 
only do it if it passes the Eligibility Test. 
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An example of this (which we will outline in greater detail later) is where a doctor 
who kills his one patient to save the lives of five, passes the first question in the test, 
but fails the second question, and thus fails the eligibility test. Not killing his patient 
however, passes the eligibility test, but will result in lower expected consequences 
than killing his patient when partially univeralised (due to less lives being saved). 
However even though killing his patient will result in higher expected utility overall 
when partially universalised, he must still not kill his patient, as killing his patient fails 
the Eligibility Test, and thus is impermissible. 
 
How we can apply Panoptic Consequentialism to solve the moral dilemmas we 
presented earlier, so that the answers they give are more in line with our moral 
intuitions than Act Consequentialism? 
 
Let us now see, using the two classes of universalisation problems with traditional Act 
Consequentialism that we outlined earlier, how the counter-intuitive acts that Act 
Consequentialism obligates of us can be negated and in what ways we can move 
forward in a semi-consequentialist framework, to deal with these problems. Let us first 
restate our third formulation of the Eligibility Test under Panoptic Consequentialism 
for clarity: 
 
1.  “For some number of other people N, if N people acted in a similar way to me in 
relevantly similar circumstances, would it be expected to result in worse consequences 
than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
2. “For a person P, if P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, 
would it be expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
An act will only pass the Eligibility Test if the answer to both questions is “No”, 
regardless of the numerical value of N, or the identity of P or Q.  If two or more acts 
pass the Eligibility Test the one with the highest expected utility is the one we ought to 
do, if only once act passes the Eligibility test, then this is the act we ought to do. 
 
Let us try to use this principle to look at the doctor/patient scenario we brought up 
earlier. In this sole instance for the doctor deciding how to act, (to kill or not to kill the 
patient) it would surely maximise consequences for him to kill his patient, and thus 
this is how he should act. For that sole doctor in this single localised instance, it is 
clear cut case (there are no other factors as stake, since no one will copy him, or lose 
their confidence in him, or find out) for him as a committed Act Consequentialist, a 
choice between ten people dying and one person, where it is worse for ten to die than 
one, and thus he must kill the patient.  
 
However, to many (most?) people, this seems highly counter-intuitive, as it seems 
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abominable to have to kill the one patient. Panoptic Consequentialism however, has a 
way out. Now if this doctor (when deciding how to act) were to use the Panoptic 
Principle, he would see that while the first half of the principle will not necessarily be 
expected to result in worse consequences than if he hadn’t acted (other people acting 
in a similar way to me and killing their patients will be expected to end up with good 
consequences), the second half of the principle clearly would; as “if a person P, if P 
believed that someone Q would act in a similar way to me...”“  this would in fact be 
expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn’t acted. 
 
Patient P, when deciding whether to go visit their doctor Q for medical treatment 
(believing that their doctor Q would kill his or her patients when doing so would save 
more lives), would seemingly rationalise to himself or herself, that unless they were 
going to die anyway, that there would be no point in going to their doctor. They would 
reason to themselves that if they are not going to die anyway (say they have a broken 
arm, or are going blind etc), to go to the doctor seems like a horrible risk as you might 
end up being killed by your doctor.  
 
Thus it seems that if for a person P, P believed that someone Q would act in a similar 
way to me (killing their patient if it saves two lives or more), they would not go to the 
doctor unless they were sure they would die anyway, or unless their condition was so 
bad that death would be better anyway, thus leading to a lot more suffering of people 
not going to the doctor until that critical threshold is crossed. 
 
Thus it seems that killing the one patient to save ten, does not pass the Eligibility Test 
(it passes one of the tests, but fails the other), and thus we do not need to look any 
further (we do not need to re-run the test on the other option, by asking what if other 
people didn’t kill their one patient to save the lives of ten others etc; for as we have 
already seen it is impossible for “A” and “not A” to both fail the Eligibility Test) to 
decide how to act.  
 
However, for the sake of argument, and just so we can compare, let us look at the 
converse of this where the doctor asks, “should I let the ten people die and not kill the 
one”. Now in the first half of the panoptic principle (for some number of other people 
N, if N people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly similar circumstances), it 
would not be expected to result in worse consequences than had I not acted (the ten 
would have died anyway), so it passes the first half of the test.  
 
In the second half of the test (for a person P, if P believed that someone Q would act in 
a similar way to me), the result would be that people would have great confidence in 
their doctors and thus have no qualms about seeing them (or at least that the 
consequences of P believing this would be no worse than if I hadn't acted), so it again 
clearly passes the second half of the test.  
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Thus whilst not killing your one patient to save ten passes both tests, killing your one 
patient to save ten, fails one of the tests (as we have seen earlier, it is logically 
impossible for doing and not doing a certain act to both fail both the tests). Thus, that 
is why it is not permissible to kill the one to save ten. We have only explored both 
options here for clarity, but remember it is not possible that both “A” and “not A” can 
fail the Eligibility Test (not pass both questions), so we do not need to apply it to “not 
A” if “A” fails it. 
 
Thus, it seems that Panoptic Consequentialism does indeed have a way out of this 
dilemma. Now sure it is not purely consequentialist in nature (it is not always the case 
that some people will believe that others would act in a similar to me), and draws in 
some Kantian universality, but it still has a very consequentialist flavour. Pure Kantian 
universality assess right and wrong based upon contradictions in the will, Panoptic 
Consequentialism however asses right and wrong based upon the welfarist 
consequences of universality (of other people acting in a similar way to me, or of 
some people believing that others would act in a similar way to me).  
 
Thus Panoptic Consequentialism universalises (much like Kantianism) but from a 
consequentialist perspective (assessing the consequences that arise out of partial 
universalisation). It takes the best aspects of consequentialism and marries them to the 
best aspects of Kantianism, allowing it to escape the problems faced by both of these 
ethical theories.  
 
Thus, we can see that the answer to the doctor dilemma is that we should not kill the 
one patient to save the ten. Thus, looking at these dilemmas through Panoptic 
Consequentialism avoids the repugnant conclusions that Act Consequentialism entails. 
This same reasoning can also readily deal with the dilemma of whether to hang the 
innocent man, to stop the mob going wild and killing twenty people, where what the 
Act Consequentialist theory entails us to do is wrong.  
 
Again, we ask:  
 
1.  “For some number of other people N, if N people acted in a similar way to me in 
relevantly similar circumstances, would it be expected to result in worse consequences 
than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
2. “For a person P, if P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, 
would it be expected to result in worse consequences than if I hadn't acted at all?” 
 
A n act will only pass the Eligibility Test if the answer to both questions is “No”, 
regardless of the numerical value of N, or the identity of P or Q.  If two or more acts 
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pass the Eligibility Test the one with the highest expected utility is the one we ought to 
do, if only once act passes the Eligibility test, then this is the act we ought to do. 
 
Now sure it may be that if others acted as I did (hanging the one innocent man so the 
other twenty do not die), it might be expected to maximise consequences (less people 
being killed, and no one ever finding out what you did, thus being expected to bring 
about better consequences than if I hadn't acted); but if we look at the second half of 
the principle (for a person P, if P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way 
to me), it would totally undermine the justice system. People would lose all 
confidence in their liberties being upheld by the law. They would believe that if it 
maximised consequences to do so, their liberties would be violated instantly (a clearly 
innocent man being hung etc). Thus, no one would feel safe from or with the law and 
thus would not trust it, making the justice system collapse.   
Thus if the sheriff were deciding whether he should hang the innocent man, he would 
see that doing so would pass the first question, but fail the second one and thus not be 
permissible. Thus, by definition, it is impermissible to hang the innocent man (and 
thus we do not need to reapply the test to not hanging the innocent man, since it has 
already failed the test for if he was to hang the man).  
 
Again, however, for the sake of clarity and exposition, we will look at this converse. 
What if the sheriff were to not hang the innocent man? Well the principle would say 
that, if for some number of other people N, N people acted in a similar way to me in 
relevantly similar circumstances, it would not be expected to result in worse 
consequences than if I hadn't acted at all (the people would have died anyway), and 
that if for a person P, P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way to me, it 
would give them even greater confidence in the legal system and greater willingness 
to trust in it. Thus not hanging the innocent man passes both of the Eligibility Tests 
whilst hanging the innocent man only passes one. 
 
Now given these two dilemmas which Panoptic Consequentialism solves, which 
otherwise plague Act Consequentialism, people may just say that it only solves these 
because it requires too little of us (not requiring us to bring about more good as an 
end, and only requiring us to “do no harm”). However, this is not true and be clearly 
seen using the contrast case we outlined early with the trolley example and the 
doctor/patient example. Act Consequentialism tells us that it is obligatory to divert the 
train to kill the one and save the five, and also that it is obligatory to kill the one 
patient to save the other ten. However, to our moral intuitions, though it feels right (or 
even just merely permissible) to divert the train to kill the one and save the five, it is 
highly counter-intuitive to say that we must kill the one patient to save the other ten. 
Act Consequentialism has no way of escaping or explaining this paradox. 
 
This dilemma that arises from this contrast case, however, is easily solvable using 
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Panoptic Consequentialism. The person deciding whether to divert the train to kill the 
one (and save the five) would ask himself, “what if for some number of other people 
N, N people acted in a similar way to me in relevantly similar circumstances?“ well 
surely this would bring about better consequences than not acting, so it clearly passes 
the first test. The second test then will ask, “What if for a person P, P believed that 
someone Q would act in a similar way to me?” The answer again here would clearly 
show that it passes the second test as it won't result in worse consequences than my 
not acting(it would make negligible difference if some people believed that some 
others would act in a similar way to me by diverting the train to save 5).  
 
Thus diverting the train to kill the one to save five passes the Eligibility Test. 
Remember that both “A” and “not A” can pass the Eligibility Test, so even though 
“A” passes the Eligibility Test does not mean it is what we ought to do, as the “act” 
that we ought to do is “the act that has the highest expected utility, given that is passes 
the Eligibility Test”. Thus, we need to look at what happens if the agent does “not A” 
as well. 
 
Thus, let us now look at the converse, of the person thinking about not diverting the 
train (and thus having it run over the five people as opposed to the one). He would ask 
himself “What if for some number of other people N, N people acted in a similar way 
to me in relevantly similar circumstances“, well if other people acted in this way it 
would not bring about worse consequences than if I hadn’t acted (five people would 
die anyway), and thus it passes the first test. Now on the second test when he asks 
himself “what if for a person P, P believed that someone Q would act in a similar way 
to me?” the answer would be that it wouldn’t change anything, it wouldn’t bring about 
worse consequences than if I hadn’t acted, so again it passes the second test and thus 
passes the Eligibility Test. 
 
Now considering diverting the train and not diverting the train both pass the Eligibility 
Test, we then must look at which one will result in higher expected utility. Killing the 
one to save the five clearly would, and thus that is what we must do. Thus according 
to Panoptic Consequentialism, we must kill the one to save the five in the runaway 
train example, yet we are forbidden from killing the one patient to save the other ten in 
the doctor/patient example (as killing the patient does not pass our permissibility test). 
This fits perfectly in line with our moral intuitions. 
 
Act Consequentialism on the other hand however, would say that we are obligated to 
kill the one person to save the five in the runaway train example (giving the same 
answer as Panoptic Consequentialism), but that we are also obligated kill the one 
patient to save the other ten (which is highly counter intuitive to us.) Thus, Panoptic 
Consequentialism successfully solves the dilemma from this contrast case, which Act 
Consequentialism cannot. 





Thus as we have seen, Act Consequentialism does entail us to many counter-intuitive 
conclusions, all of which are escapable by using Panoptic Consequentialism. Whilst 
other theories like Rule Utilitarianism and Generalisation Arguments have tried to 
consider these factors by increased universalisation, where they fail is primarily upon 
internal inconsistencies, or collapsing back into Act Consequentialism a problem 
faced by many rule-based theories. 
 
Thus in order to move forward with consequentialism (or ethics in general), it seems 
we must have an act based theory that has greater universalisation than Act 
Consequentialism but is not so extremely universalised like Rule 
Utilitarianism/Kantianism/Generalisation Arguments etc. If none of the rule-based 
alternatives seems viable, it seems we must keep looking for another theory. Thus, I 
have tried to show a rough outline/format of what such a theory would look like. I do 
not claim that this rough outline is the be all and end  and that it will solve all the 
world's problems, but rather that it is just an example of what such a theory has to look 
like and take into consideration in order solve these problems inherent in traditional 
Act Consequentialism. 
 
I have shown how current attempts to deal with these counter-intuitive problems (Rule 
Utilitarianism and Generalisation Arguments) fail, and how by looking at these 
problems from a Panoptic Consequentialist perspective we outlined earlier, we have a 
way of escaping the Act Consequentialist's conclusions. Thus in order to move 
forward in consequentialism to solve these counterintuitive problems, these 2 issues 
must be addressed. I have not attempted to provide an comprehensive alternative 
theory to Act Consequentialism, or to show a complete way out of these problems, but 
merely shown what issues must be addressed if we are to move forward in ethics in 
the future.  
 
Thus, this is a superiority argument for a new form of consequentialism, in preference 
to its more universalised rival conceptions. However this may well not be the only 
way to avoid the dilemmas arising from a purely consequentialist theory. There may 
well be other ways to deal with these difficulties, which I have not even suggested. I 
do not claim either that using this panoptic principle can solve all the problems facing 
consequentialism. However, unless a more acceptable answer can be formulated for 
the problems of counter intuitive results and collapse objections, we should begin to 
construe “consequentialism” in terms of its more panoptic and universalised variety.  
This new “restricted consequentialism” may be a lot more complex than a simple 
Generalisation Argument, localised Act Consequentialism, or ideal code, but its 
greater complexity allows it to deal with more objections than other competing 
theories, that would otherwise render it incoherent. Thus, I contend that in order to 
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move forward in consequentialist ethical theory this increased universalisation has to 
be acknowledged, accepted, and embraced, and not just brushed under the carpet, and 
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